 |
The 42nd Annual Midyear Meeting
of the Health Physics Society |
 |
|
The 42nd Annual Midyear Meeting
of the Health Physics Society |
|
SAM-A
|
| Chair(s): Dick Toohey, |
|
SAM-A.0 8:15 Opening Comments. Toohey R, President, HPS
|
|
SAM-A.1 8:25 A Federal Interagency-Level View of Response To Radiation Emergencies. Taylor T, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President ttaylor@ostp.oep.gov
Abstract: Congress established OSTP through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-282). OSTP has two primary missions. OSTP staff advises the President and his staff on scientific issues. Staff works closely with counterparts in other offices of the Executive Office of the President to ensure that science is adequately represented and well understood. Secondly, OSTP coordinates research and development across the federal government. In areas where it is necessary to coordinate research across federal agencies, OSTP provides these agencies with an opportunity to come together, discuss their research programs and develop a coordinated approach to ensure that there are no gaps in the research, no repetition in research investments, and that budgets are being used wisely. OSTP is engaged in a number of interagency activities to strengthen our national response to radiological emergencies, particularly in preparation for managing the catastrophic consequences of a terrorist attack using a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or nuclear device. Activities being conducted through the National Science and Technology Council will be described, including the Nuclear Defense Research and Development Roadmap and the recently published Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following RDD and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents. |
|
SAM-A.2 9:00 FDNY Response to a Radiological Emergency: Decisions of the Incident Commanders. Ingram R, Fire Department of New York
Abstract: A look at the pre-incident issues faced by responders in technology, standards, and training that impact planned post-event tactical operations of Fire/HAZMAT, Law Enforcement, and Health and Emergency Medical Service providers with a specific view of the Fire Department , City of New York response. This presentation will include a brief review of the current state of equipment, technology, standards and testing for responders today and how the FDNY incorporates these capabilities into its training programs and internal tactical response plans to meet the goals of the NYC interagency plan. |
|
SAM-A.3 10:05 Communicating with the Media in the Aftermath of a Radiological Emergency: Who Should Speak, and What Should They Say? Karam A, Karam Consulting LLC paksbi@rit.edu
Abstract: Anything associated with radiation and radioactivity sparks concerns and fears among the general public, and interest among the media. In the event of any radiological emergency, it will be necessary to tell the public what has happened and how to keep themselves and their families safe; and the most efficient way to do this is through the media. Fortunately, the media is likely to be at the scene almost immediately, although their aims may not coincide with those of the health physicists, emergency responders, and public officials who are addressing the emergency. This may produce multiple tensions, exacerbated by the fact that those most willing to talk to the media may not be those best suited for this role for any number of reasons (e.g. perceived credibility, understanding of the issues, the ability to engender public trust and confidence, etc.). These issues will be addressed, drawing upon a combination of observations and personal experience gleaned from a decade of working with the media on various radiological stories. |
|
SAM-A.4 10:40 Monitoring of People Following a Radiation Emergency: CDC’s Role. Miller CW, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Ansari A, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention asa4@cdc.gov
Abstract: Following a radiation emergency, evacuated, sheltered, or other identified members of the public would require external and/or internal radiological monitoring and, if indicated, decontamination. In addition, the potentially-impacted population would be identified for dose reconstruction, biodosimetry/bioassay, medical treatment (chelation therapy, cytokine treatment, etc.), and possible entry into long-term health and medical monitoring programs and registries. The current capacity to implement these activities at the State, local, Tribal level is extremely limited. The Department of Health and Human Services has designated the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as the lead agency to coordinate the Federal support for population monitoring activities. Under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the National Response Framework, HHS/CDC is responsible for supporting State, local, and tribal governments in (1) monitoring people for external contamination; (2) monitoring people for internal contamination; (3) population decontamination; (4) administering available pharmaceuticals for internal decontamination, as deemed necessary by State health officials; and (5) establishing a registry of potentially exposed individuals, performing dose reconstruction, and conducting long-term monitoring of this population for potential long-term health effects. CDC is undertaking a number of activities to fulfill its responsibilities in the area of population monitoring. It prepared a planning guide for state and local public health planners highlighting the many challenges in a mass casualty radiation incident and suggesting ways to address those challenges. CDC is also developing improved laboratory techniques for radioanalysis of urine bioassays, and it is studying the use of existing hospital equipment as well as hand-held radiation instruments for rapid screening and prioritization of individuals with internal contamination. In addition, CDC recently developed a training toolkit, specifically tailored to public health professionals, for planning and responding to radiation emergencies. |
|
SAM-A.5 11:15 EPA’s Response Role after a Radiological Emergency. Cardarelli II JJ, EPA National Decontamination Team cardarelli.john@epa.gov
Abstract: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has statutory authority to conduct environmental response activities for hazardous substance emergencies, including radionuclides. These authorities are reflected in the National Response Framework under Emergency Support Function 10 and the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. The Framework presents the principles that enable all response partners to prepare and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. It establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incidents. As laid out under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, EPA has varying roles and responsibilities associated with a multi-agency response to radiological emergencies, depending on the ownership or control of the materials involved in the emergency. Other major players at the Federal level include the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Department of Homeland Security, including Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Coast Guard. In some cases EPA may lead Federal environmental response activities, while in others it may provide support to another Federal agency. Regardless of which Federal agency leads the Federal response actions, EPA provides long-term coordination of Federal support for environmental monitoring activities through leadership of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, which transitions from DOE to EPA during the intermediate phase of a response to a radiological emergency. EPA regional and headquarter resources support local and state authorities via the incident command system throughout the response. Decisions about clean-up levels and decontamination technologies will be determined through the optimization process outlined in the Department of Homeland Security guidance on protective actions for response to radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. The agency’s response to the TOPOFF 4 RDD exercise, lessons learned, and a summary of an internal agency RDD recovery workshop will demonstrate the agency’s current capabilities, capacities, and the considerable task that lies before us to effectively carry out our response and clean-up responsibilities. In addition, the actions the agency is taking to enhance our current capabilities will be presented. |